Erkölcsi igazolás és politikai kötelezettség (Moral justification and political obligation)

Journal of Legal Theory (Jogelmeleti Szemle) 5 (4) (2004)
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Abstract

The paper focuses on John Rawls’ theory of political obligation. Rawls bases political obligation on our natural duties of justice, which are mediated to us by our sense of justice. Therefore the justification of political obligation also requires moral justification: the justification of the principles of justice. In the paper I first investigate that part of Rawls’ argument that has the role of justification: the method of reflective equilibrium. This method raises several problems, the most severe of which is that it neglects the fact of pluralism. The second part of the paper deals with this problem. I analyse how Rawls’ theory and his method of justification has changed as a result of taking into account the fact of pluralism. Finally, building on the demands of pluralism and the shortcomings of the Rawlsian answer, I present a possible theory of political obligation. This theory is grounded in the interpretation of the community’s political culture while fitting it into a discourse-based theoretical framework.

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Attila Tanyi
University of Tromsø

Citations of this work

Rawls különbözeti elve (Rawls’ Difference Principle).Attila Tanyi - 2007 - Hungarian Review of Political Science (Politikatudomanyi Szemle) 16 (2):125-150.

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References found in this work

Why Deliberative Democracy is Different.Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson - 2000 - Social Philosophy and Policy 17 (1):161.

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