Caring for Esteem and Intellectual Reputation: Some Epistemic Benefits and Harms

Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84:47-67 (2018)
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Abstract

This paper has five aims: it clarifies the nature of esteem and of the related notions of admiration and reputation ; it argues that communities that possess practices of esteeming individuals for their intellectual qualities are epistemically superior to otherwise identical communities lacking this practice and that a concern for one's own intellectual reputation, and a motivation to seek the esteem and admiration of other members of one's community, can be epistemically virtuous ; it explains two vices regarding these concerns for one's own intellectual reputation and desire for esteem: intellectual vanity and intellectual timidity ; finally, it offers an account of some of the epistemic harms caused by these vices.

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Alessandra Tanesini
Cardiff University

Citations of this work

Harms and Wrongs in Epistemic Practice.Simon Barker, Charlie Crerar & Trystan S. Goetze - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84:1-21.
Višedimenzionalizam, otpor i demografski problem.Ian James Kidd - 2023 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 19 (1):4-30.
Vices of distrust.J. Adam Carter & Daniella Meehan - 2019 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 8 (10):25-32.

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References found in this work

Intellectual Humility: Owning Our Limitations.Dennis Whitcomb, Heather Battaly, Jason Baehr & Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3):509-539.
Vice Epistemology.Quassim Cassam - 2016 - The Monist 99 (2):159-180.
Intellectual Humility as Attitude.Alessandra Tanesini - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):399-420.
"Calm down, dear": intellectual arrogance, silencing and ignorance.Alessandra Tanesini - 2016 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 90 (1):71-92.

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