Noûs 53 (3):540-563 (2019)

Authors
Brian Talbot
University of Colorado, Boulder
Abstract
Accuracy‐first epistemology is an approach to formal epistemology which takes accuracy to be a measure of epistemic utility and attempts to vindicate norms of epistemic rationality by showing how conformity with them is beneficial. If accuracy‐first epistemology can actually vindicate any epistemic norms, it must adopt a plausible account of epistemic value. Any such account must avoid the epistemic version of Derek Parfit's “repugnant conclusion.” I argue that the only plausible way of doing so is to say that accurate credences in certain propositions have no, or almost no, epistemic value. I prove that this is incompatible with standard accuracy‐first arguments for probabilism, and argue that there is no way for accuracy‐first epistemology to show that all credences of all agents should be coherent.
Keywords accuracy  epistemic value  probabilism
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Reprint years 2017, 2019
DOI 10.1111/nous.12237
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.

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Citations of this work BETA

Headaches for Epistemologists.Brian Talbot - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Epistemic Repugnance Four Ways.Brian Talbot - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3001-3022.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

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