Studia Philosophica Estonica 2 (2):157-176 (2009)

Authors
Brian Talbot
University of Colorado, Boulder
Abstract
There is widespread controversy about the use of intuitions in philosophy. In this paper I will argue that there are legitimate concerns about this use, and that these concerns cannot be fully responded to using the traditional methods of philosophy. We need an understanding of how intuitions are generated and what it is they are based on, and this understanding must be founded on the psychological investigation of the mind. I explore how a psychological understanding of intuitions is likely to impact a range of philosophical projects, from conceptual analysis to the study of (non-conceptual) "things themselves" to experimental philosophy.
Keywords intuitions  psychology  experimental philosophy  conceptual analysis
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DOI 10.12697/spe.2009.2.2.09
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Reforming Intuition Pumps: When Are the Old Ways the Best?Brian Talbot - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):315-334.
The Fallacy of the Homuncular Fallacy.Carrie Figdor - 2018 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 31:41-56.

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