Presentism and Distributional Properties

In Karen Bennett & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics volume 7. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 305-314 (2012)
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Abstract

Ross Cameron proposes to reconcile presentism and truth-maker theory by invoking temporal distributional properties, instantiated by present entities, as the truth-makers for truths about the past. This chapter argues that Cameron's proposal fails because objects can change which temporal distributional properties they instantiate and this entails that the truth-values of truths about the past can change in an objectionable way.

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Author Profiles

David Ingram
University of York
Jonathan Tallant
Nottingham University

Citations of this work

Nefarious Presentism.Jonathan Tallant & David Ingram - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):355-371.
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Ostrich presentism.Giuliano Torrengo - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):255-276.
Against Non‐Ludovician Time.Robert E. Pezet - 2017 - Analytic Philosophy 58 (4):330-359.

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References found in this work

Truth and truthmakers.D. M. Armstrong - 2004 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Truth and ontology.Trenton Merricks - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Presentism and properties.John Bigelow - 1996 - Philosophical Perspectives 10:35-52.
The Way Things Were.Ben Caplan & David Sanson - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):24-39.

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