Abstract

This article analyzes the judicial framework of the takeover bid regulation in Lithuania, identifies the obstacles to the more effective regulation and considers possible solutions. As laid down in the Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and the Council as well as in the Law on Securities of the Republic of Lithuania, if a natural or legal person acquires a specified percentage of voting rights in the company (the issuer), which gives him a certain degree of control of the company, this person must announce and implement a mandatory takeover bid to protect the minority shareholder rights. The regulation process of takeover bids in Lithuania, however, encounters several obstacles in aiming to increase the protection of minority shareholders. The authors claim that the main problems preventing a more efficient takeover regulation are first, issues related to the counting rules of the voting rights and second, the lengthy process of implementing mandatory takeover bids (the implementation process could last up to six years). Finally, the definition of a fair price of the security presents another obstacle to a more efficient takeover regulation as well. The matter of a fair and reasonable price is the most important in emerging markets, such as Lithuania