Natural Kinds, Mind-independence, and Unification Principles
Synthese 200 (2):1-23 (2022)
Abstract
There have been many attempts to determine what makes a natural kind real, chief among them is the criterion according to which natural kinds must be mind-independent. But it is difficult to specify this criterion: many supposed natural kinds have an element of mind-dependence. I will argue that the mind-independence criterion is nevertheless a good one, if correctly understood: the mind-independence criterion concerns the unification principles for natural kinds. Unification principles determine how natural kinds unify their properties, and only those natural kinds that have a mind-independent unification principle should be considered real.Author's Profile
DOI
10.1007/s11229-022-03661-7
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Citations of this work
From naturalness to materiality: reimagining philosophy of scientific classification.David Ludwig - 2023 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 13 (1):1-23.
References found in this work
A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism: Knowing the Unobservable.Anjan Chakravartty - 2007 - Cambridge University Press.
A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive.John Stuart Mill - 1843 - University of Toronto Press.
The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science.Edward Jonathan Lowe - 2006 - Clarendon Press.
Realism, Anti-Foundationalism and the Enthusiasm for Natural Kinds.Richard Boyd - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 61 (1):127-148.
