Two grounds of liability

Philosophical Studies 178 (11):3503-3522 (2021)
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Abstract

This essay argues that culpability and responsibility are independent notions, even though some of the same facts make us both responsible and culpable. Responsibility for one’s conduct is grounded in the strength of the agential connection between oneself and one’s conduct. Culpability for one’s conduct is the vices that give rise to that conduct. It then argues that responsibility and culpability for causing a threat are each grounds of liability to defensive harm independent of the other.

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Citations of this work

Responsibility and iterated knowledge.Alex Kaiserman - 2023 - Philosophical Issues 33 (1):83-94.
Actions, Agents, and Consequences.Re’em Segev - 2023 - Criminal Justice Ethics 42 (2):99-132.
Manipulation and liability to defensive harm.Massimo Renzo - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (11):3483-3501.

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References found in this work

What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments.R. Jay Wallace - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.

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