AbstractI shall argue that there is no such property of an event as its “probability.” This is why standard interpretations cannot give a sound deﬁnition in empirical terms of what “probability” is, and this is why empirical sciences like physics can manage without such a deﬁnition. “Probability” is a collective term, the meaning of which varies from context to context: it means diﬀerent — dimensionless [0, 1]-valued — physical quantities characterising the diﬀerent particular situations. In other words, probability is a reducible concept, supervening on physical quantities characterising the state of aﬀairs corresponding to the event in question. On the other hand, however, these “probability-like” physical quantities correspond to objective features of the physical world, and are objectively related to measurable quantities like relative frequencies of physical events based on ﬁnite samples — no matter whether the world is objectively deterministic or indeterministic.
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Citations of this work
Robustness, Diversity of Evidence, and Probabilistic Independence.Jonah N. Schupbach - 2015 - In Mäki, Ruphy, Schurz & Votsis (eds.), Recent Developments in the Philosophy of Science: EPSA13 Helsinki. Springer. pp. 305-316.
Defusing Bertrand’s Paradox.Zalán Gyenis & Miklós Rédei - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (2):349-373.
What Remains of Probability?Laszlo E. Szabo - 2010 - In F. Stadler (ed.), The Present Situation in the Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 373--379.
References found in this work
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science | Vol 73, No 3.Thomas Müller - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (3):487-520.
How Causal Probabilities Might Fit Into Our Objectively Indeterministic World.Matthew Weiner & Nuel Belnap - 2006 - Synthese 149 (1):1-36.