A physicalist account of mathematical truth

Abstract

Realists, Platonists and intuitionists jointly believe that mathematical concepts and propositions have meanings, and when we formalize the language of mathematics, these meanings are meant to be reflected in a more precise and more concise form. According to the formalist understanding of mathematics (at least, according to the radical version of formalism I am proposing here) the truth, on the contrary, is that a mathematical object has no meaning; we have marks and rules governing how these marks can be combined. That’s all.

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Laszlo E. Szabo
Eotvos Lorand University of Sciences

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