Abstract

Despite recent interest in the virtues, critics have consistently challenged the notion that study of the virtues can form the core of a comprehensive ethical theory. Central to this challenge is a common complaint; it is argued that virtue theories provide insufficient practical guidance in decision-making contexts, and cannot provide clear criteria for making moral judgments about discrete acts. My primary purpose here is to answer these charges. ;Aristotle's classical account of the virtues and their relation to human flourishing relies on the implausible metaphysical assertion that as human beings all persons have an essential function. However, it remains plausible to support the Aristotelian contentions that virtuous dispositions of character are necessary conditions for flourishing, and rules and principles alone are inadequate guides for moral judgment. ;Critics claim that virtue ethics cannot cope with ethical dilemmas, but it is a mistake to expect an ethical theory to provide an algorithmic decision-procedure for determining how to act in specific circumstances, and all theories face difficulties when considering genuine moral quandaries. ;Michael Slote's account of virtue ethics, by showing that the principles of virtue ethics can generate recommendations, helps to counter the claim that virtue ethics fails as a guide for human action. However, his approach is seriously flawed, because of his reliance on intuitive judgments as means for determining which traits count as virtues . ;A plausible virtue theory must be based on a serious consideration of the relevance of basic goods in human life. Food, water and shelter, a social context conducive to flourishing, friendship and love are all necessary conditions for flourishing. By examining the social nature of these basic goods, we can develop an account of prima facie obligations, since the need for basic goods is common to all persons. ;The virtue theory that I defend will generate greater obligations toward friends than toward remote others. In addition, the virtues can generate particular obligations in certain circumstances. For example, in medical practice it can be important to act compassionately, even when our actions might not directly benefit the patient