On Suspending Properly

In Luis Oliveria & Paul Silva (eds.), Propositional and Doxastic Justification. Routledge (forthcoming)
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Abstract

We argue for a novel view of suspending judgment properly--i.e., suspending judgment in an ex post justified way. In so doing we argue for a Kantian virtue-theoretic view of epistemic normativity and against teleological virtue-theoretic accounts.

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Author Profiles

Kurt Sylvan
University of Southampton
Errol Lord
University of Pennsylvania

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