Early 2012 Dissertation Draft - 'Respect for Truth and the Normativity of Epistemic Rationality'

Dissertation, (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

On the Normativity of Epistemic Rationality.Kurt Sylvan - 2014 - Dissertation, New Brunswick Rutgers
Epistemic Rationality and Epistemic Normativity.Patrick Bondy - 2017 - New York: Routledge.
No Commitment to the Truth.Anna-Maria A. Eder - 2021 - Synthese 198:7449-7472.
Two types of epistemic instrumentalism.Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5455-5475.
Can the aim of belief ground epistemic normativity?Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3181-3198.
Rationality Without Rules.Herman Edward Stark - 1995 - Dissertation, The University of Memphis
Evidence and Normativity: Reply to Leite.Thomas Kelly - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):465-474.
Biological Function and Epistemic Normativity.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (1):94-110.
Varieties of epistemic instrumentalism.Daniel Buckley - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9293-9313.
Is Epistemic Normativity Value-Based?Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2017 - Dialogue 56 (3):407-430.
Epistemic Normativity.Stephen R. Grimm - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic value. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 243-264.
Précis zu The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 71 (4):560-4.
Sosa on the normativity of belief.Pascal Engel - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):617-624.
The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The distinctive “should” of assertability.John Turri - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (4):481-489.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-04-14

Downloads
478 (#38,107)

6 months
165 (#17,407)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Kurt Sylvan
University of Southampton

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references