Cohen on evidential support

Mind 81 (322):244-248 (1972)
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Abstract

CENTRAL TO COHEN’S NEW THEORY OF INDUCTION IS THE CLAIM THAT THE SUPPORT GIVEN BY EVIDENCE TO A HYPOTHESIS IS NOT A FUNCTION WHICH OBEYS THE AXIOMS OF THE PROBABILITY CALCULUS. THIS CLAIM DEPENDS ON THE TRUTH OF COHEN’S INSTANTIAL COMPARABILITY PRINCIPLE. UNDER NATURAL INTERPRETATIONS OF ’SUPPORT’, THIS PRINCIPLE IS FALSE. EVEN IF IT IS TRUE UNDER OTHER INTERPRETATIONS OF ’SUPPORT’, THAT DOES NOT SHOW THAT CONFIRMATION IN CARNAP’S SENSE DOES NOT OBEY THE AXIOMS

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