The No-Proposition View of Vagueness

Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (2):179-195 (2016)
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Abstract

This paper proposes a novel method of identifying the nature of vague sentences and a novel solution to the sorites paradox. The theory is motivated by patterns of use that language users display when using vague predicates. Identifying a coherent cause of this behaviour provides us with a theory of vague sentences that is behaviour- rather than paradox-led. The theory also provides a solution to the sorites paradox and is therefore more explanatory than other available theories of vagueness.

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Paula Sweeney
University of Aberdeen

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References found in this work

Vagueness, truth and logic.Kit Fine - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):265-300.
Understanding Truth.Scott Soames - 1998 - Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press USA.
Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):589-601.
Logic for equivocators.David Lewis - 1982 - Noûs 16 (3):431-441.

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