Eric Swanson
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
We can think of ordinary truth-conditional semantics as giving us constraints on cognitive states. But constraints on cognitive states can be more complicated than simply believing a proposition. And we communicate more complicated constraints on cognitive states. We also communicate constraints that seem to bear on affective and conative states.
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Practical Language: Its Meaning and Use.Nathan A. Charlow - 2011 - Dissertation, University of Michigan

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