Strawson's analysis of identity statements

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (4):597-599 (1971)
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Abstract

THIS PAPER DISCUSSES TWO THINGS. FIRST, STRAWSON'S EXPLANATION IN "ON REFERRING" ("MIND," 1950) WHY TWO USES OF SENTENCES OF THE FORM NN=NN MUST DIFFER FROM THOSE OF THE FORM NN=THE F, WHERE 'NN' AND 'THE F' ARE PROPER NAMES AND DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS, RESPECTIVELY. IT IS SHOWN THAT HIS ACCOUNT OF THE MATTER HAS UNACCEPTABLE CONSEQUENCES. SECONDLY, IT IS DEMONSTRATED THAT HIS EXPLANATION OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SENTENCES OF THE FORM NN=THE F AND THOSE OF THE FORM NN IS (AN) F IS EVEN LESS SATISFACTORY. STRAWSON'S CONFUSIONS HERE DERIVE CHIEFLY FROM HIS NOTION OF A 'PRESUPPOSITION'

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