In Richard Menary (ed.),
The Extended Mind. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press. pp. 189--225 (
2010)
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Abstract
On the extended mind hypothesis (EM),l many of our cognitive states and
processes are hybrids, unevenly distributed across biological and nonbiological
realms (Clark 1997; Clark and Chalmers 1998). In certain circumstances,
things-artifacts, media, or technologies-can have a cognitive
life, with histories often as idiosyncratic as those of the embodied brains
with which they couple (Sutton 2002a, 2008). The realm of the mental
can spread across the physical, social, and cultural environments as well
as bodies and brains. My independent aims in this chapter are: first, to
describe two compatible but distinct movements or "waves" within the
EM literature, arguing for the priority of the second wave (and gesturing
briefly toward a third); and, second, to defend and illustrate the interdisciplinary
implications of EM as best understood, specifically for historical
disciplines, by sketching two case studies.