An explanatory heuristic gives rise to the belief that words are well suited for their referents

Cognition 143 (C):228-240 (2015)
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Which words are most iconic?Bodo Winter, Marcus Perlman, Lynn K. Perry & Gary Lupyan - 2017 - Interaction Studies. Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systemsinteraction Studies / Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systemsinteraction Studies 18 (3):443-464.

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