Kantian Review 13 (1):52-81 (2008)

Authors
David Sussman
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
Abstract
In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant presents the moral law as the sole ‘fact of pure reason’ that neither needs nor admits of a deduction to establish its authority. This claim may come as a surprise to many readers of his earlier Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. In the last section of the Groundwork, Kant seemed to offer a sketch of just such a ‘deduction of the supreme principle of morality’ . Although notoriously obscure, this sketch shows that Kant hoped to base the moral law in the freedom that rational agents can claim as members of the ‘intelligible world’ that transcendental idealism makes available to us. In contrast, the second Critique abandons all aspirations of deriving morality from more basic notions of freedom and practical rationality
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DOI 10.1017/S1369415400001096
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References found in this work BETA

Creating the Kingdom of Ends.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
Kant's Theory of Freedom.Henry E. Allison - 1990 - Cambridge University Press.
Creating the Kingdom of Ends.James Lenman - 1996 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (4):487-488.
The Unity of Reason: Rereading Kant.Susan Neiman - 1994 - Oxford University Press.

View all 15 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Kant’s Deductions of Morality and Freedom.Owen Ware - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (1):116-147.
Delusions of Virtue: Kant on Self-Conceit.Kate Moran - 2014 - Kantian Review 19 (3):419-447.
Practical Cognition and Knowledge of Things-in-Themselves.Karl Schafer - forthcoming - In Evan Tiffany & Dai Heide (eds.), Kantian Freedom. Oxford University Press.

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