Some remarks on problems and methods in the philosophy of science

Philosophy of Science 21 (3):242-248 (1954)
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Abstract

What sort of subject is the philosophy of science? It would be difficult to find any sort of agreement on the answer to this question. There are a large number of physicists who have promoted the idea that the subject is a kind of cosmic journalism: any new major discoveries in physics warrant an up-to-the- minute, catch-as-catch-can analysis of the boundaries of scientific knowledge. On the other hand, the Oxonian sirens of ordinary language tell us that any careful scrutiny of technical scientific matters is not proper philosophical activity. I want to argue that the philosopher of science need be neither a journalist of science nor merely an acute man of common sense eternally restricted to contemplating the general meaning of such notions as those of mind, free will, cause and determinism.

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References found in this work

Testability and meaning.Rudolf Carnap - 1936 - Philosophy of Science 3 (4):419-471.
Testability and meaning (part 1).Rudolf Carnap - 1936 - Philosophy of Science 3 (4):420-71.
Testability and meaning (part 2).Rudolf Carnap - 1937 - Philosophy of Science 4 (4):1-40.
Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning.Carl Gustav Hempel - 1950 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4 (11):41-63.
A set of independent axioms for extensive quantities.Patrick Suppes - 1951 - Portugaliae Mathematica 10 (4):163-172.

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