On Being a Fan and on Fanhood and Its Implications for Defeating the Moral Sceptic

Dialogue 61 (2):347-368 (2022)
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Abstract

RésuméJ'emploie la notion de partisannerie, telle qu'elle est employée dans le domaine des sports (fanhood), pour m'opposer à la thèse de la dépendance de David Gauthier, selon laquelle s'il est rationnellement requis d'adopter une disposition, les actes qui l'expriment sont eux aussi rationnellement requis. J’établis d'abord que la partisannerie est un engagement assez similaire à un engagement moral. Je soutiens ensuite que, parce que la véritable partisannerie se caractérise par des comportements intrinsèquement irrationnels tels que l'emploi de « porte-bonheur » ou l'adoption de pratiques superstitieuses qui, selon le supporter, aideront son équipe à gagner, cela soulève une objection décisive à la thèse de la dépendance, éliminant ainsi une tentative prometteuse de venir à bout du scepticisme moral.

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Anita Superson
University of Kentucky

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References found in this work

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Morality and advantage.David P. Gauthier - 1967 - Philosophical Review 76 (4):460-475.
What good is commitment?Cheshire Calhoun - 2009 - Ethics 119 (4):613-641.

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