Misidentification, truth, and knowing that

Philosophical Studies 23 (3):186 - 197 (1972)
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Abstract

Identifying demonstratives are of the form 'this d', Where d is a descriptive noun phrase. I am concerned with the effect of a misidentifying identifying demonstrative on the truth of propositions such as 'this d is p'; I argue there are circumstances in which 'this d is p' can be true when the referent of 'this d' is a p but is not a d. Extending the results, I argue there are circumstances where 'i know that this d is p' and 'i believe that this d is p' can be true when the referent of 'this d' is a p but is not a d. The philosophical importance of the results is discussed

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