Deliberating groups versus prediction markets (or Hayek's challenge to Habermas)

In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 192-213 (2011)
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Abstract

For multiple reasons, deliberating groups often converge on falsehood rather than truth. Individual errors may be amplified rather than cured. Group members may fall victim to a bad cascade, either informational or reputational. Deliberators may emphasize shared information at the expense of uniquely held information. Finally, group polarization may lead even rational people to unjustified extremism. By contrast, prediction markets often produce accurate results, because they create strong incentives for revelation of privately held knowledge and succeed in aggregating widely dispersed information. The success of prediction markets offers a set of lessons for increasing the likelihood that groups can obtain the information that their members have

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Citations of this work

Mandevillian Intelligence.Paul R. Smart - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):4169-4200.
The Social Epistemology of Consensus and Dissent.Boaz Miller - 2019 - In M. Fricker, N. J. L. L. Pedersen, D. Henderson & P. J. Graham (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 228-237.
What's Wrong with Partisan Deference?Elise Woodard - forthcoming - In Worsnip Alex (ed.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Vol. 8. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
What Is Minimally Cooperative Behavior?Kirk Ludwig - 2020 - In Anika Fiebich (ed.), Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. pp. 9-40.

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References found in this work

Democracy and disagreement.Amy Gutmann - 1996 - Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Edited by Dennis F. Thompson.

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