Deliberating groups vs. prediction markets (or Hayek's challenge to habermas)

Episteme 3 (3):192-213 (2006)
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Abstract

For multiple reasons, deliberating groups often converge on falsehood rather than truth. Individual errors may be amplifi ed rather than cured. Group members may fall victim to a bad cascade, either informational or reputational. Deliberators may emphasize shared information at the expense of uniquely held information. Finally, group polarization may lead even rational people to unjustifi ed extremism. By contrast, prediction markets often produce accurate results, because they create strong incentives for revelation of privately held knowledge and succeed in aggregating widely dispersed information. The success of prediction markets off ers a set of lessons for increasing the likelihood that groups can obtain the information that their members have

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