A somewhat eliminativist proposal about phenomenal consciousness

In Hieke and Leitgeb (ed.), Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences: Papers of the 31st International Wittgenstein Symposium. The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society (2008)
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Abstract

This paper develops a proposal about phenomenal consciousness that is (somewhat) eliminativist in two respects. First, regarded in the light of some common ways of conceiving of consciousness, the proposal is "deflationary". Second, it opens up space for a development in which what we now naturally think about as consciousness turns out to be many different things.

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2009-02-06

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Pär Sundström
Umeå University

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References found in this work

Consciousness and Cognition.Michael Thau - 2002 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Deconstructing the Mind.Stephen P. Stich - 1996 - New York, US: Oup Usa.
The harder problem of consciousness.Ned Block - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (8):391-425.

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