The Further Question: Frege, Husserl and the Neo-Kantian Paradigm
Abstract
Once upon a time, Frege influenced Husserl. More precisely, Frege's scathing review of Philosophie der Arithmetik induced Husserl to abandon his commitment to logical psychologism. There are many different reasons for dismissing this traditional tale. Yet at least one widely circulated claim cannot be upheld, for it is rooted in the false belief that Frege held logic to be an essentially normative science. Rather, Frege and Husserl are united by their shared conception of logic as the maximally general theoretical science. Further, it is proposed that Frege indeed may have influenced Husserl in the movement from psychologism to phenomenology. This time, however, the novel possibility is entertained that Frege provided Husserl with nothing less than an initial rationale of the very need for a phenomenology: the epistemological clarification of the cognitive sources of "pure logic". Along the way, Frege's peculiar Kantianism is revealed to be of a piece with his philosophical contemporaries, the neo-Kantians, in its dependence upon the central notion of a source of knowledge. As a key component of Frege's theory, it is revealed not as an artefact of the new logic but rather as part of the earliest picture which serves to undergird Frege's views on the nature of epistemological justification