Believing badly ain’t so bad

Philosophical Psychology 36 (6):1208-1216 (2023)
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Abstract

The Covid-19 pandemic provides the newest example of staunch polarization in the epistemic community, providing ample opportunity for profound disagreements on its origin and the international resp...

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10.1080/09515089.2022.2077717

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Author's Profile

Ema Sullivan-Bissett
University of Birmingham

Citations of this work

Bad beliefs: automaticity, arationality, and intervention.Stephen Gadsby - 2023 - Philosophical Psychology 36 (4):778-791.

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References found in this work

The Factual Belief Fallacy.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2018 - Contemporary Pragmatism (eds. T. Coleman & J. Jong):319-343.

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