Philosophical Studies 146 (1):49 - 74 (2009)

Arthur Sullivan
Memorial University of Newfoundland
Following Neale, I call the notion that there can be no such thing as a structured referring expression ‘structure skepticism’. The specific aim of this paper is to defuse some putative counterexamples to structure skepticism. The general aim is to bolster the case in favor of the thesis that lack of structure—in a sense to be made precise—is essential to reference.
Keywords Philosophy of language  Philosophical logic  Reference  Semantics  Stephen Neale
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-008-9244-y
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,177
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Studies in the Way of Words.H. P. Grice - 1989 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

View all 84 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

On Referring: Donnellan Versus Strawson.Antonio Capuano - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (4):1091-1110.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
67 ( #169,568 of 2,499,417 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #418,166 of 2,499,417 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes