An Improved Whole Life Satisfaction Theory of Happiness

International Journal of Wellbeing 1 (1):149-166 (2011)
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Abstract

According to the popular Whole Life Satisfaction theories of happiness, an agent is happy when she judges that her life fulfils her ideal life-plan. Fred Feldman has recently argued that such views cannot accommodate the happiness of spontaneous or pre-occupied agents who do not consider how well their lives are going. In this paper, I formulate a new Whole Life Satisfaction theory which can deal with this problem. My proposal is inspired by Michael Smith’s advice-model of desirability. According to it, an agent is happy when a more informed and rational hypothetical version of her would judge that the agent’s actual life matches the best life-plan for her. This view turns out to be a flexible model which can avoid many problems of the previous theories of happiness.

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Jussi Suikkanen
University of Birmingham

Citations of this work

Meaning and Happiness.Antti Kauppinen - 2013 - Philosophical Topics 41 (1):161-185.
The Good in Happiness.Jonathan Phillips, Sven Nyholm & Shen-yi Liao - 2014 - In Tania Lombrozo, Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Volume 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 253–293.
Happiness.Dan Haybron - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Not More than a Feeling.Kevin Reuter, Michael Messerli & Luca Barlassina - 2022 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 11 (1):41-50.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

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Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Anarchy, State, and Utopia.Robert Nozick - 1974 - New York: Basic Books.
Truth and objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Moral realism.Peter Railton - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (2):163-207.
Impartial reason.Stephen L. Darwall - 1983 - Ithaca N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

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