Thinking as a Team: Towards an Explanation of Nonselfish Behavior

Social Philosophy and Policy 10 (1):69-89 (1993)
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Abstract

For most of the problems that economists consider, the assumption that agents are self-interested works well enough, generating predictions that are broadly consistent with observation. In some significant cases, however, we find economic behavior that seems to be inconsistent with self-interest. In particular, we find that some public goods and some charitable ventures are financed by the independent voluntary contributions of many thousands of individuals. In Britain, for example, the lifeboat service is entirely financed by voluntary contributions. In all rich countries, charitable appeals raise large amounts of money for famine relief in the Third World. The willingness of individuals to contribute to such projects is an economic fact that requires an explanation

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Robert Sugden
University of East Anglia

Citations of this work

Collective Intentions And Team Agency.Natalie Gold & Robert Sugden - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (3):109-137.
Joint actions and group agents.Philip Pettit & David Schweikard - 2006 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (1):18-39.
Collective Intentionality.David P. Schweikard & Hans Bernhard Schmid - 2012 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Framing Joint Action.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):173-192.

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References found in this work

Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Lewis - 1969 - Synthese 26 (1):153-157.
Utilitarianism and Co-Operation.Donald Regan - 1980 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Rationality and salience.Margaret Gilbert - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 57 (1):61-77.
Coordination.David Gauthier - 1975 - Dialogue 14 (2):195-221.

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