Vague Naturalness as Ersatz Metaphysical Vagueness

Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 11:243–277 (2018)
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I propose a view that I call "Ersatz Metaphysical Vagueness" according to which the term "perfectly natural" can be semantically vague. As its name suggests, the view mimics traditional metaphysical vagueness without the radical metaphysical underpinnings. In particular, the ersatzer avoids a widely accepted argument schema (advanced by JRG Williams, Ted Sider, Cian Dorr, John Hawthorne and others) according to which, if there is no metaphysical vagueness, F-ness cannot be both perfectly natural and vague.



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Rohan Sud
Virginia Tech

Citations of this work

Quantifier Variance.Rohan Sud & David Manley - 2020 - In Ricki Bliss & James Miller (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 100-17.

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References found in this work

Vagueness, multiplicity and parts.Daniel Nolan - 2006 - Noûs 40 (4):716–737.

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