Faith and Philosophy 16 (3):297-314 (1999)

Authors
Michael Sudduth
San Francisco State University
Abstract
This paper presents a critical analysis of Alvin Plantinga’s recent contention, developed in Warranted Christian Belief (forthcoming), that if theism is true, then it is unlikely that religious unbelief is the product of properly functioning, truth-aimed cognitive faculties. More specifically, Plantinga argues that, given his own model of properly basic theistic belief, religious unbelief would always depend on cognitive malfunction somewhere in a person’s noetic establishment. I argue that this claim is highly questionable and has adverse consequences for Plantinga’s epistemology of religious belief. Plantinga’s proper basicality thesis together with his view of rationality defeaters suggests that there are circumstances in which theistic belief would not be proper function rational even if theism is true
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy and Religion
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0739-7046
DOI 10.5840/faithphil199916336
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,979
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2011-12-02

Total views
131 ( #89,046 of 2,504,870 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #417,030 of 2,504,870 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes