Philosophical Studies 167 (1):119-139 (2014)

Authors
Rohan Sud
Toronto Metropolitan University
Abstract
Adam Elga (Philosophers’ Imprint, 10(5), 1–11, 2010) presents a diachronic puzzle to supporters of imprecise credences and argues that no acceptable decision rule for imprecise credences can deliver the intuitively correct result. Elga concludes that agents should not hold imprecise credences. In this paper, I argue for a two-part thesis. First, I show that Elga’s argument is incomplete: there is an acceptable decision rule that delivers the intuitive result. Next, I repair the argument by offering a more elaborate diachronic puzzle that is more difficult for imprecise Bayesians to avoid.
Keywords Formal epistemology  Decision theory  Imprecise credences
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-013-0235-2
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 70,163
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Risk and Rationality.Lara Buchak - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations.Edward Francis McClennen - 1990 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
The Toxin Puzzle.Gregory S. Kavka - 1983 - Analysis 43 (1):33-36.
Subjective Probabilities Should Be Sharp.Adam Elga - 2010 - Philosophers' Imprint 10.

View all 11 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Imprecise Probabilities.Seamus Bradley - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Decision Making in the Face of Parity.Miriam Schoenfield - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):263-277.
Normative Decision Theory.Edward Elliott - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):755-772.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Dutch Book Arguments and Imprecise Probabilities.Seamus Bradley - 2012 - In Dennis Dieks, Stephan Hartmann, Michael Stoeltzner & Marcel Weber (eds.), Probabilities, Laws and Structures. Springer.
Subjective Probabilities Need Not Be Sharp.Jake Chandler - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1273-1286.
Expressing Credences.Daniel Rothschild - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (1pt1):99-114.
Roger White’s Argument Against Imprecise Credences.Dylan Dodd - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (1):69-77.
Unsharp Sharpness.Nils-Eric Sahlin & Paul Weirich - 2014 - Theoria 80 (1):100-103.
Epistemic Utility and Norms for Credences.Richard Pettigrew - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (10):897-908.
You’Ve Come a Long Way, Bayesians.Jonathan Weisberg - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):817-834.
Rational Probabilistic Incoherence.Michael Caie - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (4):527-575.
Subjective Probabilities Should Be Sharp.Adam Elga - 2010 - Philosophers' Imprint 10.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-11-19

Total views
94 ( #124,354 of 2,507,021 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #140,021 of 2,507,021 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes