Grazer Philosophische Studien 99 (1):78-98 (2022)

Authors
Scott Sturgeon
University of Birmingham
Abstract
It is argued that higher-order awareness is central to one type of everyday rationality. The author starts by specifying the target notion of rationality, contrasting it with other useful notions in the neighbourhood. It is then shown that the target notion relies on first-person awareness of the unfolding of cognition. This is used to explain the kernel of truth in epistemic conservatism, the structure of defeasibility, and the root motive behind the widely accepted distinction between rational inference and trivial entailment.
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DOI 10.1163/18756735-00000157
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References found in this work BETA

Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.
The Epistemic and the Zetetic.Jane Friedman - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (4):501-536.
The Basing Relation.Ram Neta - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (2):179-217.
Defeasible Reasoning.John L. Pollock - 1987 - Cognitive Science 11 (4):481-518.

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