Defending conventions as functionally a priori knowledge

Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1149-1160 (2003)
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Abstract

Recent defenses of a priori knowledge can be applied to the idea of conventions in science in order to indicate one important sense in which conventionalism is correctsome elements of physical theory have a unique epistemological status as a functionally a priori part of our physical theory. I will argue that the former a priori should be treated as empirical in a very abstract sense, but still conventional. Though actually coming closer to the Quinean position than recent defenses of a priori knowledge, the picture of science developed here is very different from that developed in Quinean holism in that categories of knowledge can be differentiated.

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David J. Stump
University of San Francisco

References found in this work

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas Samuel Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - University of Chicago Press.
On Certainty (Ed. Anscombe and von Wright).Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1969 - New York and London: Harper Torchbooks.
Mathematics as a Science of Patterns.Michael David Resnik - 1997 - Oxford, England: New York ;Oxford University Press.
Space, Time, and Spacetime.Lawrence Sklar - 1974 - University of California Press.

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