Abstract

There are three serious problems in the ongoing debate over whether or not to grant ethical significance to race. First, although disagreement over whether or not "race" is a "real" or "objective" concept is only part of the debate, exchanges have increasingly concentrated on this issue. The result is that currently, the question of whether or not to grant ethical significance to race is most often presented as primarily a metaphysical rather than a normative one. This is misleading because the metaphysical disagreement reflects underlying normative concerns, rather than the other way around. Second, the normative debate centers on whether or not people of African descent in the United States are justified in granting ethical significance to race by treating members of their race as if they were family. I argue, however, that choosing to treat members of one's race as family is a right. Like other rights, it entails concomitant obligations to act upon it only in ways that do not infringe upon other rights of other people. The important question, therefore, is whether and how people can treat members of their race as family without infringing upon the rights of others. I argue that this is possible and delineate the responsibilities and limitations involved. Third, much of the debate is a consequentialist debate over whether strategies that promote granting ethical significance to race or strategies that promote denying ethical significance to race will help to mitigate anti-black oppression. Yet neither side offers an adequate analysis of anti-black oppression to support their claims. I present and defend an analysis that suggests that granting ethical significance to race is important for fighting anti-black oppression. While I do not intend this as a justification for granting ethical significance to race, because I argue that justification is not required, I offer it to persuade those who deny ethical significance to race to reconsider their position