Why externalism is not a problem for ethical intuitionists

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1):77–90 (1999)
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Abstract

Ethical intuitionists are often criticised on the ground that their view makes it possible for an agent to believe that she ought to ? whilst lacking any motive to ?-that is, on the ground that it involves, or implies a form of externalism. I begin by distinguishing this form of externalism (what I call 'belief externalism') from two other forms of ethical externalism-moral externalism, and reasons externalism. I then consider various reasons why one might think that ethical intuitionism is defective in so far as it involves, or implies belief externalism, and argue that these objections are unpersuasive

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Philip Stratton-Lake
University of Reading

Citations of this work

The Many Moral Particularisms.Sean McKeever & Michael Ridge - 2005 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):83-106.
The many moral particularisms.Michael Ridge - 2005 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):83 - 106.
Reconciling realism with humeanism.Terence Cuneo - 2002 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (4):465 – 486.
Methods in ethics: Introduction.Ben Colburn - 2015 - The Virtual Issue of the Aristotelian Society 3: Methods in Ethics.

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