Normativity I – The Dialectical Legacy

South African Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):207-218 (2011)
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Abstract

With Habermas it is important to realize that one has to differentiate between moral and non-moral (a-moral) norms, which is different from what is immoral. However, since the Renaissance reflections on human freedom were caught up in the dialectic of necessity (nature) and freedom. A brief sketch is given of the development of this dialectic within modern philosophy – as it was manifested in the thought of Descartes, Hobbes, Leibniz, Locke, Berkely, Hume, Kant, Schelling, Hegel, Comte, Marxism, the Baden school of neo-Kantianism (Windelband, Rickert, Weber) and existentialism (Jaspers, Merleau-Ponty). The influence of the neo-Kantian opposition of facts and values within social thought is briefly highlighted, followed by a brief characterization of the normative inclination of human beings. Then some of the problems entailed in the modern concept of freedom are analyzed in relation to the idea of autonomy. This idea is burdened by the problem that the conditions for being human have to coincide with what meets these conditions, namely the human being. In addition it is difficult to derive collective norms from the autonomy of a single individual. The alternative avenue suggested by the idea of ontic normativity will be investigated in a separate article, exploring the way towards a more integral understanding of normativity

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