Moral overridingness and moral theory

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (2):170–189 (1998)
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I begin by proposing and explicating a plausible articulation of the view that morality is overriding. I then argue that it would be desirable for this thesis to be sustained. However, the prospects for its vindication will depend crucially on which moral theory we adopt. I examine some schematic moral theories in order to bring out which are friendly and which unfriendly to moral overridingness. In light of the reasons to hope that the overridingness thesis can be sustained, theories apparently incompatible with it – I argue that consequentialism is one – have a count against them.



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Sarah Stroud
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Citations of this work

Skepticism about Ought Simpliciter.Derek Clayton Baker - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13.
On Scepticism About Ought Simpliciter.James L. D. Brown - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Consequentializing.Douglas W. Portmore - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (2):329-347.
Are Moral Reasons Morally Overriding?Douglas W. Portmore - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (4):369-388.
Beliefs That Wrong.Rima Basu - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Southern California

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