In defence of the open question argument

The Journal of Ethics 8 (2):179-196 (2004)
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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to defend G. E. Moore's open question argument, understood as an argument directed against analytic reductionism, the view that moral properties are analytically reducible to non-moral properties. In the first section I revise Moore's argument in order to make it as plausible and resistant against objections as possible. In the following two sections I develop the argument further and defend it against the most prominent objections raised against it. The conclusion of my line of reasoning is that the open question argument offers the best explanation of our responses to the questions put in the argument, namely that analytic reductionism is mistaken.

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Caj Strandberg
University of Oslo

Citations of this work

A plea for non-naturalism as constructionism.Luciano Floridi - 2017 - Minds and Machines 27 (2):269-285.
What is a philosophical question?Luciano Floridi - 2013 - Metaphilosophy 44 (3):195-221.
Phenomenal, Normative, and Other Explanatory Gaps: A General Diagnosis.Neil Mehta - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (3):567-591.
Permanent Contributions in Philosophy.William G. Lycan - 2019 - Metaphilosophy 50 (3):199-211.

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References found in this work

Moral relativism defended.Gilbert Harman - 1975 - Philosophical Review 84 (1):3-22.
Moral functionalism and moral motivation.Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit - 1995 - Philosophical Quarterly 45 (178):20-40.
The paradox of analysis.Richard A. Fumerton - 1983 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 43 (4):477-497.

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