Bayesian confirmation theory: Inductive logic, or mere inductive framework?

Synthese 141 (3):365 - 379 (2004)

Abstract

Does the Bayesian theory of confirmation put real constraints on our inductive behavior? Or is it just a framework for systematizing whatever kind of inductive behavior we prefer? Colin Howson (Hume's Problem) has recently championed the second view. I argue that he is wrong, in that the Bayesian apparatus as it is usually deployed does constrain our judgments of inductive import, but also that he is right, in that the source of Bayesianism's inductive prescriptions is not the Bayesian machinery itself, but rather what David Lewis calls the ``Principal Principle''.

Download options

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 72,856

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
173 (#70,088)

6 months
3 (#197,508)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Michael Strevens
New York University