A closer look at the 'new' principle

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):545-561 (1995)
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Abstract

David Lewis, Michael Thau, and Ned Hall have recently argued that the Principal Principle—an inferential rule underlying much of our reasoning about probability—is inadequate in certain respects, and that something called the ‘New Principle’ ought to take its place. This paper argues that the Principle Principal need not be discarded. On the contrary, Lewis et al. can get everything they need—including the New Principle—from the intuitions and inferential habits that inspire the Principal Principle itself, while avoiding the problems that originally caused them to abandon that principle.

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Michael Strevens
New York University

References found in this work

Humean Supervenience Debugged.David Lewis - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):473--490.
A subjectivist’s guide to objective chance.David K. Lewis - 1980 - In Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Volume II. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 263-293.
The theory of probability.Hans Reichenbach - 1949 - Berkeley,: University of California Press.
Correcting the guide to objective chance.Ned Hall - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):505-518.
Undermining and admissibility.Michael Thau - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):491-504.

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