Specific and Generic Objects in Cavell and Thomas Aquinas

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):48-74 (2003)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Here I establish a parallel between modem epistemology and traditional metaphysics: between the way we know an object, on the one hand, and the way an object’s causes cause it to exist, on the other. I show that different efficient causes in the Thomistic system correspond to different questions of knowledge, as analyzed by Stanley Cavell, and that in particular the question the Cavellian skeptic asks corresponds to God’s causation in creation. As I have explained in detail elsewhere, and discuss briefly here, this parallel represents far more than a formal analogy between a series of issues in epistemology and a series of issues in metaphysics. It helps to explain, in fact, why modern philosophers (e.g., Husserl) were ultimately driven to put the human ego in the place of God, as creating (or “positing”) the objects of its knowledge, thereby denying the very distinction between epistemology and ontology.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 79,743

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Aquinas on Mental Being.Gabriele Galluzzo - 2010 - Quaestio 10:83-97.
Nothing to Know.Martin Shuster - 2014 - Idealistic Studies 44 (1):1-29.
The sense of community in Cavell's conception of aesthetic and moral judgment.Jennifer A. McMahon - 2014 - Conversations: The Journal of Cavellian Studies 2:35-53.
Stanley Cavell's Shakespeare.Gerald L. Bruns - 1990 - Critical Inquiry 16 (3):612-632.
Nicholas of Cusa and Man’s Knowledge of God.John L. Longeway - 1987 - Philosophy Research Archives 13:289-313.


Added to PP

23 (#516,650)

6 months
1 (#479,335)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Abraham D. Stone
University of California, Santa Cruz

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references