In Anna Bergqvist & Robert Cowan (eds.), Evaluative Perception. Oxford University Press (2018)

Authors
Dustin Stokes
University of Utah
Abstract
Both common sense and dominant traditions in art criticism and philosophical aesthetics have it that aesthetic features or properties are perceived. However, there is a cast of reasons to be sceptical of the thesis. This paper defends the thesis—that aesthetic properties are sometimes represented in perceptual experience—against one of those sceptical opponents. That opponent maintains that perception represents only low-level properties, and since all theorists agree that aesthetic properties are not low-level properties, perception does not represent aesthetic properties. I offer a novel argument—what I call the argument from seeing-as—against that sceptic which moves from consideration of ambiguous figures to consideration of visual art. It concludes that aesthetic properties are sometimes perceived and delivers a general lesson for philosophy of perception. Contrary to extant theories of rich perceptual content, aesthetic properties are far better candidates for high-level perceptual contents than standardly theorized rich contents like natural kinds.
Keywords aesthetic perception  evaluative perception  aesthetic properties  perceptual experience  admissible contents of experience  attention  perceptual learning  perceptual content  high-level content
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References found in this work BETA

Categories of Art.Kendall L. Walton - 1970 - Philosophical Review 79 (3):334-367.
Perception and the Reach of Phenomenal Content.Tim Bayne - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):385-404.
Aesthetic and Nonaesthetic.Frank Sibley - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (2):135-159.

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Citations of this work BETA

Inference as Consciousness of Necessity.Eric Marcus - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 61 (4):304-322.
Aesthetic Knowledge.Keren Gorodeisky & Eric Marcus - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-29.
Specialized Visual Experiences.Casey Landers - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (1):74-98.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

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