The Journal of Ethics 7 (4):339-363 (2003)

Authors
Karen Stohr
Georgetown University
Abstract
Contemporary virtue ethicists widely accept thethesis that a virtuous agent''s feelings shouldbe in harmony with her judgments about what sheshould do and that she should find virtuousaction easy and pleasant. Conflict between anagent''s feelings and her actions, by contrast,is thought to indicate mere continence – amoral deficiency. This ``harmony thesis'''' isgenerally taken to be a fundamental element ofAristotelian virtue ethics.I argue that the harmony thesis, understoodthis way, is mistaken, because there areoccasions where a virtuous agent will findright action painful and difficult. What thismeans is that the generally accepteddistinction between continence and virtue isunsupportable. This conclusion affects severalwell-known accounts of virtuous action,including those of Philippa Foot and JohnMcDowell. A closer look at Aristotle, however, providesanother way of distinguishing betweencontinence and virtue, based in hiscategorization of goods as noble or base. Iargue that virtue is exhibited when anagent''s feelings harmonize with his correctjudgments of value, while discrepancies betweenfeelings and correct judgments of valueindicate continence. This understanding ofcontinence and virtue enables us to accommodatethe problem cases I raise.
Keywords Aristotle  continence  Philippa Foot  John McDowell  temperance  virtue  virtue ethics  akrasia
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DOI 10.1023/A:1026111711649
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References found in this work BETA

Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?John Mcdowell & I. G. Mcfetridge - 1978 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 52:13-42.
Virtue and Reason.John McDowell - 1997 - In Roger Crisp & Michael Slote (eds.), Virtue Ethics. Oxford University Press.
Virtues and Vices.Philippa Foot - 1997 - In Daniel Statman (ed.), Noûs. Georgetown University Press. pp. 163--177.
Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?John McDowell & I. G. McFetridge - 1978 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 52 (1):13-42.
Virtue and Emotion.Susan Stark - 2001 - Noûs 35 (3):440–455.

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Citations of this work BETA

Moral Anxiety and Moral Agency.Charlie Kurth - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 5:171-195.
Anxiety: A Case Study on the Value of Negative Emotions.Charlie Kurth - 2018 - In Christine Tappolet, Fabrice Teroni & Anita Konzelmann Ziv (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on Negative Emotions: Shadows of the Soul. Routledge. pp. 95-104.
An Aristotelian Model of Moral Development.Wouter Sanderse - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 49 (3):382-398.

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