Leibniz and Kripke's sceptical paradox

Philosophical Quarterly 38 (July):326-329 (1988)
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Abstract

To preserve freedom leibniz maintains that at any point in the development of the infinite series of a monad's states there will be an unlimited range of possible developments alternative to the actual. but if so a paradox analogous to kripke's arises. at any point in the development of an individual's states, no matter how far the series had developed, there would always be an unlimited number of rules, or concepts, the series could instantiate. but in such circumstances, it would seem, god could not mean to create any particular individual

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