II—Conventional Implicature, Presupposition, and Lying

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 91 (1):127-147 (2017)
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Abstract

Responding to parts of Sorensen, it is argued that the connectives therefore and but do not contribute conventional implicatures, but are rather to be treated as presupposition triggers. Their special contributions are therefore not asserted, but presupposed. Hence, given the generic assumption that one lies only if one makes an assertion, one cannot lie with arguments in the way Sorensen proposes. Yet, since conventional implicatures are asserted, one can lie with conventional implicatures. Moreover, since conventional implicatures may be asserted by non-declarative utterances, one can lie by uttering non-declaratives carrying conventional implicatures.

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Andreas Stokke
Uppsala University

References found in this work

Studies in the way of words.Herbert Paul Grice - 1989 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy.Bernard Williams - 2002 - Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Meaning and grammar: an introduction to semantics.Gennaro Chierchia & Sally McConnell-Ginet - 2000 - Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. Edited by Sally McConnell-Ginet.

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