In defense of an epistemic probability account of luck

Synthese 196 (12):5099-5113 (2019)
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Abstract

Many philosophers think that part of what makes an event lucky concerns how probable that event is. In this paper, I argue that an epistemic probability account of luck successfully resists recent arguments that all theories of luck, including probability theories, are subject to counterexample (Hales 2016). I argue that an event is lucky if and only if it is significant and sufficiently improbable. An event is significant when, given some reflection, the subject would regard the event as significant, and the event’s epistemic probability, determined by the subject’s evidence, is the only kind of probability that directly bears on whether or not the event is lucky. I conclude with some lessons that are applicable to probability theorists of luck generally, including those defending non-epistemic probability theories.

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Gregory Stoutenburg
York College Of Pennsylvania

Citations of this work

On Luck and Modality.Jesse Hill - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1873-1887.
On Luck and Modality.Jesse Hill - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1873-1887.
On luck and significance.Jesse Hill - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-18.
Against epistemic accounts of luck.Jesse Hill - 2023 - Analysis 83 (3):474-482.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge in an uncertain world.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.

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