Expressions and their Articulations and Applications

Croatian Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):477-496 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The discussion that follows rehearses some familiar arguments and replies from the Kripke/Putnam/Burge critique of the traditional Frege/Russell/Wittgenstein views on names and predicates. Its main contributions are, first, to introduce a novel way of individuating tokens of the same expression, (what we call “articulations”) second, to then revise standard views on deference, (as this notion is understood to pertain to securing access to meaning for potentially ignorant, and confused agents in the externalist tradition going back to Putnam and Burge) and lastly, to emphasize the often conflated distinction between disambiguation and meaning fixing. Our line on deference is that it is not, and should not be conceived as, an intentional mental act, but rather indicates an historical chain of antecedent tokenings of the same expression.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,296

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Precis of Belief and MeaningBelief and Meaning.Akeel Bilgrami - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):595.
Deference and Stereotypes.Andrei Moldovan - 2016 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 12 (2):55-72.
Reference without Deference.Herman Cappelen & Max Deutsch - 2024 - In Ernie Lepore & Una Stojnic (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press.
Wittgenstein i eksternalizm.Piotr Dehnel - 2021 - Przeglad Filozoficzny - Nowa Seria:5-25.
Précis of Conjoining Meanings.Paul M. Pietroski - 2020 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):271-282.
Group-level cognition.Robert A. Wilson - 2001 - Philosophy of Science 68 (3):S262-S273.
Tension within Triangulation.Nathaniel Goldberg - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):363-383.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-06-15

Downloads
17 (#896,762)

6 months
8 (#415,230)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Una Stojnic
Princeton University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references